

ER 88-3638x

No. NSDD 315

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 315

September 22, 1988

STRENGTHENING US. FFORTS TO LIMIT GLOBAL MISSIDE PROLIFERATION

I. INTRODUCTION (U)

In 1982, I signed NSDD-70, which recognized the dangerous trend toward missile proliferation in the developing world and the threat this development posed to regional stability and ultimately to the security of the United States. NSDD-70 established the policy of the United States "to hinder the proliferation of foreign military missile systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Wearly like years later, the United States and its Economic Summit partners announced the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the first multilateral effort to inclide potential delivery systems and related technologie under non-proliferation controls. While the MTCR has a close conceptual tie to nuclear non-proliferation, NSDD-70 is such broader in scope regarding the desire to halt the spread of nuclear capable missile technology. This directive is intended to update and supplement NSDD-70, which remains in effect. (S)

Despite NSDD-70 and the MTC, missile proliferation has reached global proportions. Of about enty non-major military powers, mostly located in the Third World and known to possess or to be developing missiles, at least ten are located in the Middle East, two in Latin America, two in South Asia, four in East Asia, two in Southern Europe and South Africa.

The dangers posed by missile proliferation call for an intensified effort by the United States, its allies and other concerned countries to stem missile proliferation. This NSDD provides policy guidante in several areas to strengthen U.S. efforts in controlling missile proliferation. This NSDD will not interfere with Programs of Lon indertaken by the United States with its NATO allies or others. Such Programs of Cooperation shall be conducted in accordance with non-proliferation policies and provide the conducted in accordance with non-proliferation policies. tion policies and procedures.

POLICY REVIEW AND KEY JUDG ENT (U) II.

A senior interagency review of the problem identified the

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following adverse trends and uded that the United States and its MTCR partners must intensify afforts to control missile proliferation:

- --The number of Third World countries producing or able to produce ballistic and cruise missiles is growing at an alarming rate. By the late 1990's, as many as 15 Third World countries will either have produced or see able to produce missiles.
- --While most ballistic missiles ill be SRBMs, medium or intermediate range ballistic missiles are not far off in the future. Israel is already testing an MRBM and, by the mid-1990's, India will be able to build MRBM/IRBMs. In addition, with regard to SRBMs, the problem of re-engineering to extend their range has already become a reality with Iraq's adaptation of the Soviet-designed Scud.
- also grow in the next decade making missiles more available. Potential suppliers will grow beyond the MTCR Seven, Soviet Union, North Korea, Israel and the TRC to include Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India and traq. Moreover, some of these countries are transfering production of the proliferation.
- --Proliferation may accelerate even further as incentives grow to procure missiles. Although the current generation of export model missiles is relatively flacefrate, they have acquired great symbolic importance. Technological advances will improve the accuracy and lethality of ballistic and cruise missiles available for export.
- --While some proliferators. The capable of arming their missiles with nuclear warheads, there is a greater probability that some will arm missiles with chemical/biological weapons.

 (S)

OBJECTIVES OF THE POLICY (U)

Specific policy guidance is provided for the following areas:

- partners to show strong con inued support for the MTCR, to improve the implementation CR and to continue to explore ways and means to expand participation in the MTCR.
- --Continuing discussions with the Soveet Union and China on stemming missile proliferation. These discussions should provide the Soviets and Chinese with a groad understanding of the missile

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proliferation problem from our perspective, and seek undertakings from both countries on policies of restraint, within or outside the context of the MTCR, in missile transfers and in not undermining the controls established by the United States and its

--Approaching selected military powers to seek their cooperation in preventing the spread of missiles and related technological know-how. These approaches could also be done within or outside the context of the MTCR as appropriate. Israel, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil, with their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and active missile programs, and Egypt should head the list of priority countries.

--Approaching selected FC members and the European neutrals to seek their cooperation in stemming missile proliferation, initially, if appropriate, as adherents to the MTCR.

-- Improving the effectiveness of U.S. intelligence efforts and policy coordination with respect to missile proliferation. (S)

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY (U)

- 1. The NSC, in consultation with all Executive departments and agencies having responsibilities related to missile proliferation, will oversee the implementation of this policy.
- 2. The Department of State will take the lead in the following actions:

--proceed with the scheduled bilaterals with the Soviet Union on both the MTCR and the broader issue of global missile proliferation, stressing the global problem of indigenous development and/or foreign acquisition.

--continue to explore undertakings with the PRC on a policy of restraint in missile sales so as not to undermine the MTCR.

problem of missile proliferation in the Middle East.

--continue discussions with the Governments of Argentina and Brazil on missile proliferation.

--when appropriate, approach the Government of South Africa on missile proliferation.


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIES OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCI NCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND

SPACE ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT:

forts to Limit Global Missile Strengthening U Proliferation

The President has approved t e a tached National Security thering U.S. Efforts to Limit Global Decision Directive on Streng Missile Proliferation.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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Attachment **NSDD** 315

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--continue in a measured by negotiations wit. Pakistan to implement the U.S.-Pakistanterspic trade MOU, and continue talks with India on missile proliferation and on the missile technology side letter to the recently concluded strategic trade MOU between the U.S. and India.

--approach selected EC members and the European neutrals, particularly those countries with show the U.S. Government has entered into strategic trade greements, to discuss cooperation in stemming missile proliferation.

--prepare an assessment of which existing multilateral institutions can promote U.S. missile non-proliferation policy objectives. (S)

- 3. The Director of Central Intelligence is requested to assess the adequacy of the collection and analysis resources devoted to missile proliferation. In addition, the Director should assign a senior intelligence officer to coordinate and provide intelligence community support for this directive. (S)
- 4. Because the initiative will ask don rents to review their export control systems and make improvements where needed, and target key non-adherents to negot at strategic trade MOUs, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will conduct in interagency review of the strengths and weaknesses of our own and other MTCR efforts to control the transfer of technology under the Missile Technology Control Regime. (S)

Knald Reagun



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